

OTR Registry

76-6852

26 NOV 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Director

FROM : Donald P. Gregg
Deputy Director for Operations Training

VIA : Director of Training
Deputy Director for Administration

INFORMATION : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Balancing the Risks and Benefits of Public
Appearances Before Academic Groups

1. The attached article from Counterspy makes unpleasant reading. While it is highly tempting to go through the article on a point by point basis contrasting "what I said" to "what they printed," I believe the article is more useful as a vehicle through which to assess the risks and benefits which may result from public appearances by Agency officers before academic and civic groups.

2. As I noted in the memorandum prepared after my visit to Austin, the attitudes manifested by my questioners ranged from "skepticism to hostility." The most difficult questions for me to handle dealt with the usual bugaboos--covert action, assassination, and the "rogue elephant" conception of the Agency. These aspects of my talk are hardly touched upon by Counterspy. Instead, they feature South Korea, which at the time I felt was a minor part of my talk. (The line of questioning had been, "Why is it the CIA is so frequently lined up with repressive dictators like Park?" My response had been an attempt to outline historic and geographic factors which have led the South Koreans to take a harder internal line than we, a comfortable half-world away, feel is necessary. I cited the number of assassination attempts Park has already survived, the resultant "siege mentality" in Blue House and the great need for a peaceful change of power in South Korea--something they have never had.) The Counterspy distortions, if brought to the attention of the South Koreans, could make the job of the [] that much more difficult. This I regret deeply.

STATINTL

**SUBJECT: Balancing the Risks and Benefits of Public
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The point is, however, that any time an Agency officer gives responsible answers to tough questions posed in a public forum, the door is open for those opposed to the Agency to twist what has been said into something of potential embarrassment to us. On the other hand, if we do not offer responsible replies to our questioners, our public appearances may be counter-productive.

STAT 3. Upon hearing about the Counterspy article, I
called [] to alert him. He had had no word
STATINTL of the article and said that he had seen nothing on my
appearance in the Texas University newspaper. (A student
STATINTL reporter attended the talk.) [] reported that
Dr. Weintraub, who invited me to speak, had remained posi-
tive about my appearance, and that no negative feedback had
STATINTL been received. [] also reported that ten to twelve
"high quality applications" for CIA employment had been
received either from those who attended the talk or from
STATINTL those who had heard about it. (Two applications []
cited specifically were from black students at the law
STATINTL school.) [] said he remained enthusiastic about
future appearances by Agency speakers and hoped to set one
STATINTL up at either LSU or Tulane early in 1977. (I have already
received an invitation to speak at USC in December. []
[]

STATINTL 4. I believe that the paragraphs above set the dilemma
quite clearly--my appearance in Austin has resulted in a
possible problem for [] but has also brought
in some high quality applicants and improved some student
and faculty perceptions of what the Agency is like today.

5. I am perfectly willing to continue to make appearances
of this sort and to do my level best to give the Counterspy
genre as little as possible to work on. If we continue with
such appearances, I believe we must recognize that more
articles like the one in Counterspy are a distinct and
unpleasant possibility.

TS/

Donald P. Gregg

Attachment

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee, w/att
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1 - OTR Registry, w/o att

ILLEGIB

Revelations from CIA's Former Korea Chief

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OK Registry att. to
76-6852 memo

Donald Gregg reveals CIA Could Overthrow Park Dictatorship

By Steve McGuire

On October 6, 1976, an upper echelon CIA agent, speaking at the University of Texas, warned that if President Park runs for another six year term, as he is expected to do, he will probably not live to serve out his term. The CIA agent left it open whether the CIA would support a coup against Park like the one in which Diem was assassinated in Vietnam. The agent was Don Gregg whose background for sounding such a warning includes being the CIA chief of station in Korea until last year. Gregg spent 18 of his 25 years in the CIA in Asia. Ten of those years were spent in Japan, the rest in the Marianas, Vietnam, Burma, and Korea.

The occasion for these surprisingly candid remarks was a trip to Austin, Texas to give a lecture for a course on "Policy Makers in Government" directed by Dr. Sidney Weintraub. Gregg had expressed an interest in meeting with foreign students and the Center for Asian Studies was prevailed upon to provide a meeting place.

Gregg had much to say about his work in South Korea and about General Park. He stated that South Korea must depend on the American CIA to provide intelligence information about the North. Gregg personally feels that the best thing which Park could do would be to resign. He could then be a national hero and also be responsible for South Korea's first peaceful change of government. However, the CIA feels that a coup right now might encourage the North to attack, so they continue to provide Park with information about coup attempts. Whether they will continue to do so in the future is unclear.

Gregg had high praise for Lt. General James F. 'Holly' Hollingsworth, former allied commander along the DMZ in Korea. An article which appeared in the *Wall Street Journal* recently (January 13, 1976, p. 1) pictured Hollingsworth as an old-style general whose primal instinct was to kill commies. Hollingsworth claimed that he could end another Korean War in nine days, four days of 'real violence' and five days to clean up. Gregg said he agreed with Hollingsworth's assessment of a nine day war, and stated that the *WSJ* article was an accurate description of Hollingsworth.

Gregg told an 'amusing' story about how the U.S. once caught the South Koreans with sophisticated weaponry which they were not supposed to have. Gregg reported his information to a U.S. Admiral who promptly confronted the Korean Admiral with the charge. Of course the Korean denied it and the U.S. Admiral believed him. The U.S. Admiral then proceeded to chew Gregg out about his 'sources'.

Gregg suggested that aerial surveys be made to see if

the Koreans were building a berth for the weapon. Sure enough they were and the U.S. then confronted the Koreans with the evidence. Gregg evidently thought that placing sophisticated weapons in Korea's hands was real funny. We are lucky that they did not decide to use them.

The CIA evidently wants to keep Park and his boys from getting too far out of hand. They can have their fun as long as they do not get carried away. The CIA was involved in saving the life of an opposition leader in Korea who was on a fast boat headed out for the bay with rocks tied around his feet. In another incident the Korean CIA head was removed after he committed a brutal murder of a professor.

Regarding Cuba, and the attempts to kill Castro by the CIA-backed Mafia hit men, Gregg said that he once asked why Richard Helms failed to tell the Warren Commission about the CIA plots against Castro. Gregg was told that Helms kept quiet because Bobby Kennedy knew about the attempts but said nothing, so Helms did likewise.

Gregg characterized Kissinger as a man who likes intelligence information. Since the end of the Vietnam War, Kissinger has been one of the CIA's most 'avid customers'. Kissinger disliked the CIA during the Vietnam War because they kept telling Kissinger that the South Vietnamese were going to lose. The CIA was a major source of information during the Angolan conflict. Gregg stated that the CIA was only involved in a reporting role until after Cuba became involved. However, in order to get into Angola to provide reports, as Gregg put it, training some military troops was a quid pro quo for being allowed near the action.

Gregg claimed ignorance of the rumors that Saipan was a major nuclear weapons base. He said that the Marianas were not overflowing with CIA men, and that the CIA was not involved in squelching dissent on the islands.

From 1953 to 1963, Gregg was involved in covert activities in Japan. Japan was a case where, as Gregg put it, the CIA 'did their job right'. Apparently meaning that the radical left opposition, such as the Communist Party of Japan, was kept from acquiring popular support. The CIA, employing one of their favorite techniques, provided support for moderate left opposition parties such as the Socialists and the Social Democrats. While engaged in these covert activities, Gregg was employed as a civilian working for the Department of Army and an employee of the American Embassy. Later, Gregg worked directly with the Japanese police.

Between the years 1970 to 1972, Gregg served in Vietnam, where he began his CIA career in 1952. He was the head of Bien Hoa section, but made no mention of

Operation Phoenix.

Regarding CIA involvement in the overthrow of Allende's regime in Chile, Gregg said that the election of a Marxist in South America posed a threat to the U.S. government's design for South America. It was essential that Allende be overthrown as a lesson to other Third World countries that the U.S. will not tolerate any Communist governments which it feels threaten U.S. interests.

On international terrorism Gregg felt that Libya was the patron saint of the terrorists. According to Gregg, Libya appears to be the country which is providing a substantial part of the financial and moral support for the terrorists throughout the world.

After the general meeting with Don Gregg a number of professors gathered in the plush surroundings of the University of Texas faculty club for a cocktail party. Don Gregg and Bill Wood served as both the guests of honor and the hosts. After drinks someone asks, "Whats your sign, Don?"

"Sagittarius," he said.

"I knew it, a fire sign, a sign of adventure."

Don adds, "I don't regret my twenty-five years in the C.I.A. After all, what did the rest of my classmates do in that time, just divorces and dull jobs. I joined up because it was the thing to do at that time."

In the midst of the polite chit-chat the C.I.A. gets down to "brass tacks". Dr. Jannuzzi, director of the Center for Asian Studies, is collared and given the hard sell, to allow the C.I.A. to train their people at the Center. Jannuzzi equivocates a bit, "We can't give them any special treatment. Wouldn't a place nearer Virginia be more convenient?" Nervous at the obvious jeopardy in which such an arrangement would put the reputation of the Center, he apparently resists their blandishments.

Dr. Sidney Weintraub, who had invited Don Gregg to speak at the L.B.J. School of Public Affairs, catches people to remind everyone of the excellent opportunity to meet and interact with policy makers. Dr. Weintraub had been

approached twice by Bill Wood with the offer of a speaker from the C.I.A. including one time shortly after Weintraub's arrival (Fall 1976).

Bill Wood, the personnel director of the local C.I.A. office is everywhere with a cherry hello and a, "I don't believe we've met." No one escapes being asked: "Do you think this sort of thing is worth while?" The universal answer is affirmative, although some for different reasons than others.

The process, begun earlier, in the afternoon, discussion session of stressing the idea that the C.I.A. is basically an "alright" group of people devoted to peace and democracy, continues unabated. There might have been occasional cases of overzealousness but now the "company" has matured.

The less public process of establishing liaison with the academic community engaged in foreign area studies also continues unabated. The foreign area studies centers represent valuable sources of training and expertise to the C.I.A. and the centers are highly dependent upon an always uncertain grant funding. Grant support is a powerful inducement even when balanced against the pall of suspicion that would accrue in due time to all of the center's associates and students. That this might be morally wrong, that area specialists should not be agents of a particular government, and that they may be accordingly shut out of their countries of interest, is not brought up.

Bill Wood, always his effervescent self, attempts to recruit where possible, "When you get to the job hunting stage give me a call down at the Federal Building." In general, the urbane, sophisticated approach seems to have an almost narcotic effect on the fascinated faculty.

In conclusion, Gregg maintained that the CIA, throughout its history, was only doing what it was told to do. This includes both the 'legal and illegal' acts which the CIA committed in the name of democracy. After all, Gregg noted, the CIA is really in the 'people business'. We know that, and that's what bothers us, because we do not know which people.

continued from page 25

to carry out similar, if less ideologically complete, political actions.

Early in June 1972, acting on a series of tips, police trapped most key members of the Red Army Fraction; Baader, Raspe, and another leader Holger Meins, were captured in a dawn raid on their Frankfurt hiding place and Ensslin was apprehended while shopping in a hamburger store.

On June 15, Fritz Roderwald, in whose house Meinhof had been hiding, called the police inspector in charge of the Hanover *Baader Meinhof Kommando* (a force resembling American SWAT teams in most German cities) and turned her in. Roderwald, a 33-year-old teacher, came to regret his decision and turned over the reward money he received to the Strike Meinhof Defense Fund. According to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Meinhof and her

prison conditions described as "inadequate" to "purposefully cruel."

One woman died from cancer because prison doctors refused to diagnose her symptoms. Holger Meins died from inadequate medical attention during forced feeding after a long hunger strike by RAF prisoners. Meinhof and others were subjected to "sensory deprivation"—a new form of torture, in specialized cells, preventing all human contact. Many people have recurring hallucinations from such treatment. Meinhof herself was in a sensory deprivation cell for one six-month period and then again for two weeks last Christmas, but by all accounts had a tough mind.

But the RAF organized inside the dozen jails the government sent them to. European left and it is for this reason

Chancellor Schmidt's words after Meinhof's arrest when he called Meinhof and the Red Army Fraction "the most serious challenge in the 26-year history of our democracy."

CounterSpy editor Winslow Peck, contributing editor Philip Agee, and two former Military Intelligence officers, K. Barton Osborn and Gary Thomas, were the first witnesses called by the defense in Meinhof's trial last summer. They tried to testify on the use of German soil for the conduct of the war in Indochina. The defense hoped it might mitigate the sentences of Meinhof and her companions who were moved to protest U.S. aggression in Vietnam. But the court's president prevented the testimony and said it would only assist the "terrorists." He said there could be no defense whatsoever in a case such as this.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Balancing the Risks and Benefits of Public
Appearances by Academic Groups

FROM:

Donald P. Gregg
DD/OT/OTR

EXHIBIT NO.

NO.

OTR 76-6852

DATE

26 November 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Director of Training

To 3 and 5:

2.

3.

DDA
7D18 Hqs

4.

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A/DCI
1F04 Hqs

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As you are aware, Don Gregg is an influentially capable briefer who does an excellent job representing the Agency. We have discussed in some detail the briefing that led to the Counterspy article, and I am convinced that Don's presentation and subsequent answers to questions were handled with candor tempered with the necessary amount of discretion. It is suggested that the benefits derived from these orientation briefings far outweigh the damage done by irresponsible articles, such as the one appearing in Counterspy. It is strongly recommended that we continue with the orientations, ensuring that we critically select the briefers based upon the particular situation and sophistication of the audience. This has been done in the past for briefings provided by OTR and will continue.

Harry E. Fitzwater
Director of Training

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